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Preface

This is a monthly publication containing translations of materials on the International Communist movement selected mainly from Communist and Pro-Communist organs published in the Free World.

All articles in this report (No. 14) were taken from "SF," weekly journal of the Danish Socialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People's Party, i.e., Revisionist Party), Copenhagen. Complete source information is given under individual article headings.

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I. SOCIALISM IN DENMARK AND ITS DEVELOPMENT

This unsigned article was serialized on page 2 of the following 1960 issues: No. 20, 20 May; No. 21, 27 May; No. 22, 3 June; No. 23, 10 June; No. 24, 17 June; No. 25, 24 June; No. 26, 1 July; and No. 27, 8 July.

A. Can a Perspective be Set Up?

Can one say anything at all about this? Often one will simply dodge this question entirely, and of course nothing can be predicted with certainty. On the other hand there are trends, past and present, from which something about the future may be inferred. It is our simple duty to try to do so.

In the years after the war one has met with two kinds of answer to the question about the development of Danish socialism. One is given by the communists and is characterized by vague remarks that "one will find out in due time!"

That is not entirely honest, as the communists joined the Moscow declaration of 1957, in which is given a quite detailed scheme for the development of socialism, all the way to collectivization and regulation of intellectual life. Within the framework there is supposed to be room for "national variations", but the framework is very narrow.

The second answer is given by the social democratic ideologists and is, if possible, even more slippery. In 1947 "Fremtidens Danmark" [Denmark of the Future] set up something that suggested a socialist perspective. But in the years since then, this perspective has been replaced by what might be called the "welfare ideology": the goal is an economic framework comprising a small state sector and a large private sector, with considerable power for the government and a certain limited amount of planning that would be realized by means of financial policy. This method is already used today by "the welfare state", and there the methods of the moment are equated with the long-range good.

Such an attitude is, of course, untenable at a time when we are experiencing a technical revolution and everything is going through gigantic changes. To be satisfied with purely practical politics in such a situation, without looking more than 5 or 10 years ahead at a time, is to invite catastrophe.

Nevertheless, all one can find out about the future perspectives of the social democrats are vague remarks about the "economic life" ("capitalism" is an "obsolete" word in those circles) and social improvements within the present framework.

B. The "Welfare State" no Solution

But the "welfare state" has not abolished the fundamental evils associated with a class society and capitalism: within large sections of the working population there is a decided need for a socialistic perspective. But this is not met by the social democratic leadership and only in a hazy and vague manner by the left wing of the party and the communists.

The Socialist People's Party has no patent on possession of the latest truths: but it arose from the conviction that the Marxist analysis of reality is full of rich possibilities, if they are freely and unrestrainedly used, without sidelong glances to foreign party slogans.

By examining the development tendencies in the class struggle in and outside Denmark and drawing out conclusions from this with a view to the future, we can present a clear socialistic perspective. Of course, new dominant trends may suddenly arise, and just because of this the socialists must always have their attention directed towards the many-sided reality.

In general it may be said that socialism in Denmark for a long time in the future must take its character from the manner in which it came into being, from the specific traditions for the conduct of the class struggle in Denmark, and from the political formulas of this class struggle. It will also mean that if the bourgeoisie breaks with these traditions, for example by establishing a decidedly fascist government, Danish socialism will come into being in a different way from that which we can foresee today, and its development - at least to begin with - will be different.

But from the development in Denmark during recent decades one must conclude that the way to socialism in Denmark, taking everything into consideration, will be cleared by a struggle to give our democracy a socialistic content. Next it must be pointed out that, this analysis being correct, that (party) or those parties which carry it out, and their program, will play the decisive part in the development of socialism in Denmark.

From this it follows that already today one can say something about at least some of the characteristics of socialism in Denmark.

C. Activities Directed by the Workers

If Danish socialism is to be a result of the democratic struggle, various forms of socialized property will unavoidably be discussed. But in this field it is actually impossible to say anything concrete today. The detailed shaping up of socialized property forms is unquestionably a matter which will be determined along with the development of socialism.

On the other hand, one can very well say something about certain common features of this socialized property, especially about its management and administration. It will be democratic and unbureaucratic. As we know, socialistic economy to the East is not absolutely characterized by lack of bureaucracy, and that is not true of our domestic examples of state administration either. Is it then only a phrase that we throw out?

No! On one hand we must make it clear that state administration in a capitalistic country has nothing whatever to do with socialism. Public toilets are not a socialistic element in the class society. In many cases it is in the interest of the capitalists to get the state to assume possession and management of unprofitable enterprises. And the higher officials, who have charge of the administration of state property under capitalism, are mostly recruited from certain thoroughly antidemocratic strata of the population.

On the other hand, the starting point for a socialistic development is entirely different in Denmark from that in the eastern countries, both with regard to the historical development and the accumulated experience.

All traditions of the Danish labor movement, and especially the traditional demands that are put forth in situations when socialism is really considered (under the slogan "Swing to the Left"), demonstrate that the Danish working class has the will and the ability to fulfill Marx's and Lenin's demands, that the workers themselves shall administer their property, i.e. the socialized enterprises.

The demand for plant councils stood first on the list of desiderata of the working class after the First World War, and it was there again after the Second. Even the social democrats had to give it a prominent place in their program publication "Denmark: of the Future."

At this moment we are not experiencing any violent "swing to the left", but the employment situation gives the working class a strong position. And what do we find? The demand for a voice in management gets a central and decisive importance.

It is obvious that the working class at some future time will change this demand to a demand for the sole deciding voice (which will be an important turning point in the fight to give democracy a socialistic content). The more insight the working class achieves in the management of the capitalistic enterprises, the sooner will it understand that there is a totally superfluous wasteful element in the production: the private capitalist - and it will demand that he be removed.

For these reasons Socialistik Folkeparti supports unconditionally the demand for a voice in management and later the sole deciding voice. -- But we have still another weighty reason for doing so: the experience of the international labor movement. Today, after 42 years of practice, we know that there exists a danger of bureaucratization under socialism, if direction and management are centralized too strongly in the hands of the government authorities.

Let us sum up: (1) Due to reasons outside our immediate control (the historical development of the class struggle and the working class in Denmark) the enterprises owned by the people under Danish socialism will be administered by the workers themselves, through workers' councils or - as it is called in the traditional language of the Danish labor movement - plant councils. (2) As far as the conscious stake is concerned, Danish workers are fully aware of the risk of bureaucracy under socialism. The labor parties which fully recognize this danger and meet the demands of the Danish working class will take the lead in the struggle for socialism in Denmark.

For these reasons we can say with a fair amount of certainty that socialism in Denmark will take on an unbureaucratic form, and that the administration of socialized property will be a concern of the workers themselves.

D. A Multi-Party System

Socialism in Denmark will be characterized by a multi-party system, not only on paper, but in reality. How can one predict this with a fair amount of certainty?

We do not predict it "merely" because it is in our program. Such a program point may be regarded as simply a demand; but socialism is a social condition which does not arise from drawings with compass and ruler, but on the basis of the strivings, work and fight of large masses of humans. -- One must keep that in view at all times.

We are sure that Danish socialism will have more assurance for a real multi-party system, because it will be born of the struggle for democracy, and the growth of democracy is only possible if several parties work together; because such a system corresponds to time-honored democratic traditions in our homeland, which again are due to victories in the class struggle! And finally because the workers in Denmark - without whose help socialism cannot prevail - have learned from international experience, that an open or camouflaged one-party system will hamper their shaping of socialism and open all possibilities for misuse of power by dominant cliques.

Thus there is a multiplicity of reasons, both objective and subjective, why a one-party system is unlikely under Danish socialism.

It is clear, however, that the parties will receive a different character as the building of socialism progresses. Why?

Here one could actually speak of a general lawfulness which is related to the fact that socialism as a system has a fundamentally different content from the society of the exploiters. But let us "come down to earth". When the struggle for a virtually popular rule has been carried through, and the people's participation in the political life is no longer merely a question of voting, the content of the political framework will be changed.

How will the participation of the people in the government of the country then be expressed, aside from participation in elections? It will be expressed in a right of determination - within the framework of society - with reference to establishment and execution of forms of action and tasks in all political-administrative, economic and social units, which together constitute society. The decisions which concern society as a whole will be made by the people's representatives in complete freedom, and in that respect "parliamentarism" may be expected to be retained.

But aside from this it is especially characteristic of the socialistic democracy that there is a direct democracy - i.e. that by far the greatest number of decisions are made and carried out by those immediately concerned. This situation is emphasized by Karl Marx and especially by Lenin, and Stalin's most fundamental revision of the teachings of the socialistic classics concerns exactly this point.

Alongside the political parties, other organizations will also play a part on the level with the parties. It is quite certain that the workers' trade and economic organizations of various kinds will have such a function in a society which precisely is an expression for collaboration among all workers.

Two questions remain concerning the openly anti-socialistic parties - those parties which openly proclaim that they work for a return to the capitalistic system.

In the history of Danish democracy so far, we know of two prohibitions against political parties. The first struck at the "International", the predecessor of socialism, in the 1870's, and the other at Denmark's communist party in 1941-45. In the last case the prohibition was due to foreign pressure, to which one surely yielded suspiciously fast. But in the first case it was due to immediate and unconcealed fear that the security of the status quo was threatened. In other countries with formal democracy we have many more examples of prosecution of the labor parties (USA, France, Japan, Germany, etc.).

All together, it must be said that prohibition against anti-capitalistic parties has not been typical of the Danish democracy, and - aside from the occupation period - only has been carried out at times when the class conflict was especially sharp.

One must anticipate that a socialistic Denmark will behave in approximately the same way. A prohibition against anti-socialistic parties will be very improbable, as long as they remain on the foundation of law and do not by illegal means sharpen the class struggle to something near civil war.

Antisocialistic parties can have a function also under socialism: by their mere existence they contribute to making the socialists keep their path clean and avoid the mistakes and the bourgeois tendencies which easily can occur in the early phases of the transition period - and the popular support for them is a reliable barometer for how well (or poorly) socialism is being built.

Naturally they constitute a threat to socialism, but it must be remembered that their mighty propaganda reserves and their hold on the opinion forming media will be hamstrung with the introduction of socialistic property relationships. Finally: if socialism cannot assert itself against their clamor, then there must be something very wrong in the manner in which socialism is promoted. - Another thing is that the farther the socialistic change progresses, the more ridiculous will the propaganda for the capitalistic class rule appear.

E. A "Leading Party"

The second problem that interests us in connection with the question of several parties under socialism, is whether one particular party shall have the role as "the leading party". That is, as we know, the case in Europe and Asia wherever a socialistic national economy has been introduced.

We are not of the opinion that this condition is to be regarded as a sacred principle. The theory of the rule of the party is a corruption of Lenin's idea of the rule of the working class and the relation between class and party.

This thought is apparently rationally justified by the following reasoning: Marxism is revolutionary practice on a scientific foundation, the Marxist party studies reality, and its leadership - which is the

embodiment of the "collective wisdom" of the party - determines on a scientific basis the tasks of the state and sees to it that the people carry out these tasks.

As one will see, it is a rather modest role that is assigned to the people (and the working class); but let that go. The conclusion is that when the pronouncements of such a party are expressions of scientific truth, all other parties must be dilettante gatherings which can only create confusion and prevent the people from solving the necessary problems.

Experience has taught us something different. The "scientific" monopoly party can make mistakes, even very serious mistakes, which endanger everything. That is not surprising, because one renounces all scientific method by asserting that any group can have a patent on scientific truth; it is found only through innumerable experiments and open discussion of them.

If this were possible within the framework of a single party, would the "leading party" then also be sufficient? Theoretically it should be possible, and it was so in Russia at the time of Lenin's death. But experience again shows that if a single party - which may be ever so democratic to begin with - gets the monopoly on political power (and its functionaries the sole possession of all the state's enforcement agencies) democracy and the possibility for free discussion within this party are reduced to bondage - whereby the conditions for scientific study of reality no longer are met.

The monopoly to the real truth about social conditions is shown in practice to be a monopoly for making mistakes. No one can be without fault, but it must be stated that it must be up to the workers themselves to choose which solution to follow, to make a mistake or make the right choice: in other words, to make their own experiments. Only in this way will workers be able to govern their own society. In the opposite case they will be disfranchised and the result can be a bureaucratic parody on socialism (which then also will not be able to stand up in the final contest with capitalism).

The one-party system was never anticipated or justified by Lenin, but received a theoretical explanation by Stalin in some words about the fact that when all classes except the working class and the working farmers (who were joined together in one federation) had disappeared in the Soviet Union, a situation with several parties would be unnatural.

Is that right? Why, then, are there in many capitalistic countries several labor parties? Stalin could explain this also: one party corresponds to each class, and consequently only one party can really express the interests of the working class. That is the communist party, and all other labor parties are expressions for bourgeois influence on the workers, they are "agencies". According to this way of thinking, our party must be a bourgeois agency of the working class.

We know that this is not so. For that reason alone one cannot take Stalin's assertion seriously. But also for other reasons it must be rejected. It can be accepted only as a generalization: that parties in a

class society as a rule are expressions for interests associated with certain social classes.

One single social class can easily be represented by several parties, because there may be real disagreement within the class as to how its most important problems are to be solved. It does not necessarily have anything whatever to do with "agencies", but it is simply an expression for the difficulty ordinary people have in completely understanding the many-sided reality (a problem to which exactly the classics of Marxism give so much attention).

Be it not said hereby that bourgeois "agencies" are unthinkable. It has been historically demonstrated that such things have occurred. The czar's political party specialized in it (there perhaps we have the reason why the matter is of such great importance to the Russian Marxists): and here at home we had in the last century a regular yellow slanderous "trade union", the leadership of which accepted secret money contributions from the employers. But agencies of that sort have not played any important part in our labor movement. On the other hand, the bourgeois propaganda undoubtedly has, and it is in no way our intention to deny its existence or the threat it poses. In that case it would be difficult to explain the development of the social democracy here and abroad. It is only a matter of warning against a simplification that is based on the idea that all conflicts within the labor movement are due to the fact that one faction has found the philosopher's stone, and the other has taken over the way of thinking of the opponent.

In 1929 Stalin rejected (when confronted with an American workers' delegation) the thought of several labor parties in the Soviet Union - and justified the rejection with his idea that, to each class, there was only one corresponding party.

This theory suited him very well, because at about the same time he was meeting opposition within the CPSU, especially Trotsky was denounced as "an agent of imperialism", even if to a large extent it may have been a matter of only a pertinent discussion of investments and foreign policy.

If Khrushchev had followed Stalin's example, the proponents of the idea that the production of consumer goods should have priority over heavy industry, would have been condemned as bourgeois agents in 1955-56. Also here it was a question of a purely factual debate. Khrushchev did not follow Stalin's example, but he stopped the discussion all the same with a word of authority and fired those party members and economists who supported the "heretic" point of view.

It is of subordinate interest here, who was right in these discussions. The decisive fact is that here there was a basis for the formation of parties which would not have been the expression of class interests. Perhaps another solution could be found within the framework of a single party, anyway it was not found.

For these reasons one must reject the idea of a "leading party" under socialism. Only that or those parties which the working people in the given situation choose as the leader has a right to that designation: and it must let its mandate be tested again and again in freedom by the people.

F. Freedom for Whom and Repression for Whom?

The question of the rights to freedom and the use of force is in a way more decisive than the question of parties, because theoretically the one-party system does not exclude respect for the freedom of expression and the inviolability of the individual. That it hinders this respect is another matter.

Securing the rights of freedom as well as "public" use of force rest with the state and are two sides of its nature. It is therefore necessary to look a little closer at that fancy expression "theory of government", i.e. explanations of the nature and role of the state. During its entire fight, the labor movement has been confronted with the choice between two theories of government, the revolutionary and the opportunistic.

The theory of the revolutionary state as transition to socialism is derived from the studies of Karl Marx, especially of the Paris Commune, and further developed by Lenin and others; the doctrine of the latter about the "dictatorship of the proletariat unbounded by law" is really a much sharpened formulation of his own general theory (as it is propounded in "The State and the Revolution") as the background of the experiences of the civil war.

We have not the space to go into debates. It must suffice to say that the main content of the theory is that the transition state will secure freedom (democracy) for the workers and use compulsion (dictatorship) against the exploiters.

According to Lenin this meant an actual expansion of democracy in general; its territory would be increased much more in one social direction than it would be curtailed in another. The vast majority of society would finally achieve real and also materially guaranteed freedom of expression and individual freedom.

In the course of the last 43 years this theory of government has been practiced in several places outside our country. But some will perhaps ask, does it also have any interest for us? Yes, it has an interest for all who are socialists not only in name, because experience shows that capitalist society does not become socialistic "little by little" and "by itself." Therefore a revolutionary transformation process is necessary, and the state must play a part in this process. But which part? That is the question which this - and other - theories of government seek to answer.

Neither is it any minor problem to us, whether the earlier answers have been wholly or partly right or wrong. Therefore we must examine the practical experiences, which hitherto have occurred with the socialistic theory of government - regardless of whether these experiences were gathered abroad.

One could of course (as some do) reject or accept the theory "sight unseen", in other words, without closer scrutiny of its effects; but one would thereby really betray a lack of interest as to how Denmark is to arrive at socialism.

Briefly, the results of a study of the 43 years, during which the theory of freedom for the workers and compulsion for the exploiters has been in practice in various places, can be summed up in the following points:

1. With the help of this theory, the workers in a number of critical situations prevented the re-introduction of capitalism - namely, in a number of countries where civil war occurred. Before the revolution these countries had been autocratically governed; therefore there was no other way than that of civil war; and the overwhelming majority of the people backed socialism.

2. In Russia, democracy for the workers gradually gave way to a "democracy" for the members of the "leading party", and in turn this gave way to a clique government by the heads of the party. The "leading party" soon became the only party. Democracy for the workers became largely meaningless: (among many other examples may be mentioned the severe coercive regulations regarding the relationship of the workers to the managers, regulations partly justified during the war, but which were kept alive even up to 1956/57.)

3. This development has not been equally strong in all countries. It appears, for example, less conspicuous in China (but may also become so there). It was largely prevented in Yugoslavia because, among other reasons, the socialist forces there came into conflict with its most prominent representative, Stalin. The Yugoslav communists therefore consciously adopted the policy of strengthening democracy for the worker, especially through their self-management of the industries.

Translator's note: #4 is lacking in the original. Whether this is due to any text having been left out, or just to misnumbering, cannot be determined.

5. The theory of democracy for the workers was in a nominal way also used in a number of countries where the transition state surely was brought about through class struggle, but where it was mainly due to Soviet assistance. Here the theory was realized in close agreement with the then prevailing Soviet interpretation - for example, all tendencies towards labor management of industry (in East Germany, for example, these were very strong) were throttled at the start. In this form the theory of the socialistic build-up leads to the brink of catastrophe in several of these countries.

The practical experience so far with the socialistic theory of the transition state, which is supposed to secure democracy for the workers and use compulsion against the exploiters, can be summed up as follows: the theory has shown itself useful in very acute situations, when used in the spirit of its originators and not in a distorted (revised) form; but beyond that it has in many - though not in all - cases also turned out that the workers were the victims of severe compulsion and were left without power; also their freedom of opinion, press and freedom of organization were violated.

For the originators, Marx and Lenin, it was a natural matter that freedom for the workers would be consciously built up. Lenin figured that

the extension of democracy that had taken place with the revolution would continue at a rapid rate. He spoke in 1918 of "after the first step (after control by the workers) carrying out the second step towards socialism, that is, the workers would take over the management of production". ("On the Next Tasks of Soviet Power".)

But then the civil war broke out in full flame, and a situation arose which answered to, and had to answer to, the doctrine of "the dictatorship of the proletariat unbounded by law". Only a couple of years after the end of the civil war Lenin was put out of the control by illness, and the second step was never taken as long as the successor, Stalin, held the power. Only during a theoretical debate in 1959 was the question raised as to whether it was not about time to "take the next step".

When such a serious sidetracking has once been shown to be possible, it is clear that the socialistic revolutionary theory of government must be improved with guarantees that it will not lead to enslavement of democracy and freedom as a whole: this is the lesson gathered from experience. Because of the form it received in 1917/20, it carried dangerous possibilities which assumed a catastrophic character when the theory also was distorted by Stalin in the end of the thirties.

Why did Lenin's formulation of the theory carry such dangerous possibilities? Here it is only to be pointed out that there is a glaring contrast between socialism "where the free development of each individual is the condition for the free development of all" (Marx), and the government compulsion which - as will be shown in the next chapter - is necessary even in the gentlest transition period. This contrast is, in other words, unavoidable, and is of course sharpened when complications occur, such as foreign intervention and civil war. But it can be overcome - not automatically, but if the leading social forces (the organizations of the labor movement) go about it in a determined fashion.

It is clear that if these forces had followed Lenin's suggestions in the Soviet Union - among others the one here quoted - the government coercion would have dwindled to a minimum and lost its importance. But that did not happen - and the result was the opposite.

In the field of ideas this development resulted in barren sectarianism - that means a fixation on certain (often specially selected) formulas, which must not be confronted with reality, by which is understood the experience of 43 years.

G. Freedom and Equality for All

For Denmark in 1960 an entirely different situation prevails, than in those countries where the socialist revolution was carried out under civil war conditions. Our country does not have an autocratic militaristic government, and international capitalism has been considerably weakened as compared with 1917, 1945 and 1949. We do not figure on arriving at socialism through civil war, but on the contrary, we anticipate a development which is characterized by a striving to give the existing democracy a socialistic content.

For those reasons alone it is extremely improbable that there would be any application here at home of the revolutionary, socialistic theory

of government in the form it received in 1917-20. To this are added the foreign experiences. The real reason for the isolation of the sectarianism here at home is that it has ignored these experiences, while the Danish working class has recognized them thoroughly and has learned from them.

At this point it is natural to ask if the opportunistic theory of government, which is already found in the labor movement alongside the revolutionary, is not therefore better suited and more correct under Danish conditions?

Opportunism in the Marxist sense means to place the regard for the immediate interests of a part of the working class above the regard for the interest of the entire working class, historically and as a matter of principle. As a trend opportunism is closely related to reformism and its assertion that by means of small reforms one can "little by little" arrive at socialism. The basic idea of both is the theory of the "gradual growing into socialism", a theory which - as has been shown - at least never leads to socialism.

The modern political carriers of these viewpoints are the social democracy and the socialist international. Under the "gradual growing in" the state is, according to this theory, to have the duty of assuring formal freedom and "equal rights" for all citizens. This duty is accorded such importance that under all circumstances its fulfillment must have precedence over the social transformation.

This theory of government does not cause any particular discomfort when the politically formal democracy and its economic basis, capitalism, are relatively stable. During the transition from the system of feudalism with different law for different citizens it even meant a strengthening of progress. But a glance at historical experiences shows that it has not helped to transform society in a socialistic direction, much less to defend the gains in democratic form.

Here at home opportunism has predominated in the labor movement since the first World War. We have had war and crises, capitalism has at times been exceedingly weakened, but we have not got socialism. All chances have been passed up - or more correctly, not recognized - because the opportunistic leaders have stared themselves blind at the principle of "freedom and equal rights for all".

Internationally things have gone still worse. On one hand the genuflection to this principle led to the fact that capitalism in Western Europe, which was mortally weakened after the first World War, survived all the same - because also according to this principle the mighty capitalistic propaganda apparatus and the organization affiliated with big capital had to have full freedom (Germany in 1913 is a classical and irrefutable example). On the other hand is the circumstance that the opportunistic labor leaders took the catchword "freedom for all" more seriously than did the class enemies - so that capitalism after both World Wars could carry out a successful counter offensive, in a number of countries in the form of fascist counterrevolution.

In practice the theory of "freedom and equal rights for all" has been shown to be impossible both as an instrument in the service of the

socialistic transformation and disastrously useless as a means of protecting what has already been achieved. Why? Because it neglects the realities which both Marx and Lenin correctly pointed out: no state functions and no revolution is achieved without a certain amount of coercion. These two statements of fact constitute the real basis for the government theory of Marxism. A criticism of the opportunistic theory of government therefore throws light also on Denmark's special path towards socialism.

It is now clear that the opportunistic theory about "freedom and equal rights for all" is of no use, but rather of great harm to the working class in its struggle for democracy and socialism. In contrast the revolutionary socialistic government theory is of great importance in shaping Denmark's path towards socialism.

As has been shown, the socialistic government theory is subject to certain shortcomings; it is necessary to find guarantees that the freedom of the workers - the great majority of the people - does not get lost, that the necessary government coercion be limited to a minimum and be reduced in step with the possibility of doing so, that the traditional rules (e.g. decision by majority vote) for legislation be respected in all quarters, and that the formal democracy be really extended and not merely replaced by another formal system. The last mentioned means, among other things, that as long as the capitalist opponents follow the spirit and the letter of the law (as the socialist parties always have done here at home), the principle of "equal rights" will be maintained - but of course in such way that its content is changed; while the right today is "more equal" for the capitalists, it will in the socialistic transition state necessarily be "more equal" for the working man.

Can these guarantees be found?

The necessity has already been indicated for a purposeful striving to preserve and develop the broad democracy, which is the immediate fruit of the opening phases of the transition process. But thereby dangerously much is actually left to those forces which place themselves or are placed at the head of the transformation process. Have we any guarantee that they will consciously go about the task, the solution of which will make them superfluous?

No, that we do not have. In some cases they have done so, in others not. But we can get a sure guarantee, if only one certain condition is fulfilled.

No party must get a monopoly on socialism. We have already rejected the justifications for "the one-party system and the leading party" and now we repeat; none of the political or trade organizations of labor must - like a papal church council - be recognized as possessing the highest and only true wisdom. Surely one of the solutions proposed in a debate may be the right one, but the proponents must be on an equal footing when they appeal to the people, and the decision must be exclusively with the people. We also repeat: the right to be right and to make mistakes in questions which concerns the life of the people belongs only to the people, who must bear all possible bad consequences, and not to an assembly or group of wisecracks who often can personally evade the unpleasant consequences.

But will it go thus here at home, that during the transition to socialism the state will give room for several parties with equal rights (with free press, etc) which mutually can control one another? Will not socialism in Denmark too, lead to a one-party system, open or camouflaged, with all the unfortunate results which this system has had in several of the countries which today have a socialistic system?

No, it will not. On the contrary it is almost impossible to imagine that the demand for a real multi-party system should not be met while socialism is taking shape in Denmark.

There are two reasons that speak for this.

1. Socialism in Denmark will - provided the bourgeoisie does not violate our popular government by fascist measures - become a reality as a result of an extension of our present democracy. The fight to give our democracy a socialistic content presupposes, of course, forms of contest which fit the historical character of our democracy, as it has been shaped during almost a century and a half of class struggle, under which freedom of expression has become an ingrown custom, and the collaboration of several parties is necessary. The socialistic transition state in Denmark will be the fruit of the contributions of several parties, and consequently it will also have room for several parties.

2. The Danish working class, whose contribution is decisive for the achievement of socialism, will never accept suppression of free debate in the labor movement, of freedom of expression and of the other democratic rights. That would be contrary to the very fighting traditions of the working class and would mean giving up some of its most dearly bought victories.

The result is that unless the parties and organizations which will constitute the broad socialistic movement, by their programs and entire policy, prove to the general public that they will guard the democratic gains, the working class will deny them its confidence, and it will not put the power of government in their hands. Those who might wish to throttle democracy in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat will be - and are - rejected by the working class in Denmark.

It follows from this that the creation of a monopolistic party system in connection with the development of socialism in Denmark is not only a theoretically wrong and politically objectionable idea, but it is also an unrealistic and impossible idea. It also follows from this that personal freedom - and not antidemocratic aberrations - will be a permanent part of socialism in Denmark.

Only one condition must be fulfilled, for this to occur with certainty: that socialism in Denmark must be the achievement of the Danish working people. And we neither can nor will imagine the achievement of socialism here at home in any other way.

K. Rights to Freedom Today and Under the Transition to Socialism, the Role and Function of the State and the Law.

1. Every state is based to a certain extent on coercion - police power, economic and other means of pressure, which are used more or less equally against various sectors of the population.

The advantage of our present democracy, as compared to earlier forms of government, lies in the coercion hitting all citizens equally. The trouble is that this is only nominally true.

Let us take a look at the Danish state today. There are innumerable coercive rules, in the form of orders and prohibitions, as for example: one must serve one's military duty in one way or another, one must let one's children be educated, a woman must feed her children, one must submit to the decisions of the permanent arbitration tribunal, one must obey the decrees of the labor court.

One could continue without end. All the rules - the laws and the private agreements that are in turn guaranteed by the laws - together constitute "justice" in our society. Many of them are general - e.g. that one must have one's children vaccinated against smallpox - and can be found in all civilized countries regardless of social structure.

But others are special for our society and take notice of equality only as a matter of form; here are only two examples among innumerable ones: the freedom of expression is by law secured "for all" but the wealthy can make the most effective use of it. And if a rejected mediation proposal is enforced by law, the order applies "equally" to employers and workers, but since a mediation proposal practically never has favored the workers, the "equality" has always favored the employers.

Finally, some parts of the law are directly designed to strengthen the state and its apparatus, e.g. a regulation which says that one must not "insult a functionary in his official capacity". As the state is capitalistic, it means that these regulations are to protect the capitalist state and reinforce its authority.

For the sake of fairness it must be said in passing that the formal democracy has created such good fighting conditions for the working class, that from time to time it has been possible to introduce coercive regulations and laws which have put a damper on the worst exploitation. They have been of such a nature, however, that they do not alter the picture significantly.

The long and the short of it is that the capitalists, by virtue of their property right to the means of production (the factories, machinery, land, etc.) can make the state guarantee them the inviolability of this property, that they can utilize the formal rights to freedom far more effectively than the workers can, and that the asserted "freedom and equality for all" is only a form and cover-up for unequal rights, in other words; class rule. The bourgeois "right" is in its nature a means to secure the preservation and functioning of capitalist society.

This the opportunists have never been willing to admit, and therefore no socialism has ever come from their call for "freedom and equality for all". Their theory of government fits capitalism as the glove fits the hand, and does not have even as much regard for reality as many bourgeois political theorists have today. It would have been a miracle of biblical dimensions if with the help of this political theory one could have brought about socialism or have been able to avert fascism.

2. When even the formally democratic (capitalistic) form of government is based on coercion, and its alleged "freedom and equality for all" is

mainly a hollow phrase, then it is obviously impossible to imagine a socialistic transformation of society without a certain amount of coercion.

Just as many of the coercive measures we encounter in the Danish state today are intended to protect the private capitalistic property right to the means of production, so the laws and regulations of the socialistic transition state will unavoidably be aimed at bringing about and protecting the workers' property right to the means of production. Thereby a large part of the government coercion will be turned "the other way".

We can take as an example the socialization of the means of production. As we assume that socialism here at home will come into being as a result of an extension of the existing democracy, it is possible that one will negotiate a compensation arrangement, which will not, however, be economically advantageous to the former owners - in contrast to that nationalization which in reality strengthens capitalism. A loss of income will be quickly noticeable to them, and the material possibilities for using the "equal rights" more effectively than the workers can, will disappear. In addition the loss of the accustomed power and influence will be noticed immediately - and thereby also the loss of all that this power meant for better utilization of the "equal rights."

In reality there has thus occurred a very serious cutting down of the freedom of the capitalists. The "equal right" has turned its edge the other way.

In this respect no state, regardless of how peacefully the parliamentary revolution takes place, can get around the use of coercion towards the exploiters - if it is the intention at all to carry through the socialistic transformation.

Finally, it is utter naivete to cling to "equal rights" in situations where the reaction actually is preparing or is carrying out forcible attacks on the democracy. The reaction has often been shameless enough to exploit the principle of "freedom for all" for the purpose of abolishing freedom. Both in Germany in 1933 and in France in 1958 the social democracy was paralyzed and impressed thereby that democracy was abolished with reference to this and that paragraph in the constitution, certainly accompanied with open threats of violence.

The gonuflection to the formal "freedom for all" cost Germany very dearly, and it is not the fault of the French opportunists if the price is not as high in France.

If the reaction in similar manner attacks the socialistic gains, must the socialists then also keep the peace out of regard for the "priceless freedom and equality for all?" No, we say, in both cases the reaction is placing itself outside the law: it has forfeited all "equal rights" and squandered its freedom.

All things considered, the socialists must therefore unconditionally reject the government theory of the opportunists as unrealistic, short-sighted, without foundation, inadequate and dangerous.

The important thing is to use instead the socialistic theory of government, of freedom and coercion, in accordance with the experiments already made and in the form corresponding to the development in Denmark.

I. Conclusions

In these articles an attempt has been made to bring up to date various aspects of the Marxist theory about the transition from capitalism to socialism and to apply the theory to the historically determined Danish situation. In doing this we have also examined the opportunistic and sectarian revision attempts to which the theory has been exposed, and we have established the validity of its basic doctrines also today and under our conditions. Lastly we have made an attempt to develop the theory, partly to overcome certain shortcomings, which may be recognized by examination of the historical experience, and partly to render it fully suited for use under our domestic conditions.

It will finally be practical to bring together those conclusions that hereby have been reached, into a few simple points:

1. The way to socialism in Denmark - first to the creation of a transition state - is by an extension of the existing formal democracy. The struggle to give a socialistic content to democracy is the special characteristic of the Danish way to socialism, from the outline of which we are able to discern two phases, first the broad unification on the basis of the trade and political unity of action for the attainment of democratic and social improvements and for total disarmament of our country, and next - as a fruit of the democratic unification - unification for the attainment of socialistic goals. Under the latter phase it will be possible to establish a state which consciously has socialism as its goal - the socialistic transition state.

2. Socialism in Denmark will be characterized by the workers' direct management of the socialistic industries and of most of the "public business". Democracy will be direct. Government by the people will be extended to its real scope: a government of the people, for the people, by the people.

3. Socialism in Denmark will not have room for any one-party system, either overt or camouflaged. As long as government compulsion is necessary, socialism in Denmark will be given such form that both principles and policies of the movement can be discussed freely and without hindrance among individuals, groups and parties that represent various points of view. In the same way, final decisions will be put in the hands of the people and be settled in accordance with the majority principle. Also the anti-socialist parties - as long as they keep within the law - as the socialist parties have always done here at home - will be in a position to criticise, appeal to the people and participate in elections and referendums.

4. Freedom of expression and personal freedom, attained after almost a century and a half of class struggle, will be preserved and assured. But in accordance with the demand of socialism for real democracy and the creation of "equal right" on a real, not formal basis, the socialist transition state will undoubtedly break up the monopoly on the forming of public opinion which today is almost without limitation in the hands of capital and/or groups that think in the grooves of the capitalistic world of

ideas (through control of or influence on radio and TV, daily and weekly press, movies and all other entertainment, most of all education and literature, etc.) The opinion-forming apparatus must be in the hands of the people itself - by which is understood the working peoples' manifold local and national organizations of cultural, popular, trade and political nature, as well as the antisocialistic opposition.

But the formation of public opinion must under no circumstances be - and will not be - controlled by a single party or a national organization or controlled by a single group. That would make impossible the freedom of press and opinion - regardless of how fierce the proclamations that one might send out about it - to great detriment of the free development of humanity and the building of socialism.

5. Because freedom of press and opinion is exactly the fundamental guarantee that the traditional rules of democracy and the personal freedom and dignity are protected, and that misuse of authority of any kind, which might occur while government means of coercion are still necessary, would be immediately exposed and prevented. Freedom of the press will have its greatest effect in that the opinion-forming apparatus is put in the hands of the people, and it is secured thereby so that no single group achieves control over public opinion. Both precautions are of the greatest importance for the development of socialism, the more active and unhindered the participation of the whole population in the management of all the affairs of society, the faster, more effective and less painful will be the building of socialism. But active and unhindered participation in the management is only possible when people are secure, that is when they are both materially and intellectually free. Therefore the freedom of press and opinion plays such large and positive part in the development of socialism in Denmark.

The working class here at home knows perfectly well that a society without capitalists, autocratic employers and coupon clippers, is preferable to the present society. Despite much talk about the welfare state, the Danish workers feel every day the insecurity, injustice and lack of self-determination. They feel that regardless of what has been achieved today, it is insufficient. They know that the solution is a society where the values go undivided to those who create them, and where the direction of society is laid in the hands of those who make the society thrive and grow - the working people, that is the workers with hand and mind, in city and country, all who produce values by their own effort without exploiting others. This is the socialistic society.

For many years opportunistic labor leaders have concealed their lack of ability and wish to bring about socialism in our country by pointing to the antidemocratic aberrations in other countries, where they have tried to build socialism on other historical foundations, hindered by all kinds of human frailties, for a long time without possibility of help from the outside - and least of all from the said labor leaders - and from the beginning based on a much smaller fund of experience than what we have on hand today.

It is not reasonable to use this as an excuse. The tragic errors and crimes that have followed the process of creating socialism elsewhere in the world does not justify Danish labor leaders in discontinuing the work

to make Denmark socialistic. There is no danger that socialism in Denmark will be marred by anything of that kind provided that it is the work of the Danish working class and labor movement themselves - and we will not and cannot imagine it in any other way.

For this reason we are calling for unification to fight for democratic and social progress, for unification of the working class and all working people to the necessary fight, whose clear goal is socialism, all the workers' own society.

II. THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM: GROWING IN OR JUMPING IN

10 June 1960
Pages 2 and 10

Ejvind Riisgaard

I

In an editorial article in "OF" no. 11 the question is asked: should the adherents of socialism in Denmark "work for a gradual and harmonious growth into socialism or for a clean transition from capitalism to socialism, i.e. a fundamental changing of society".

In simplified form the answer was that as the idea of growing into socialism had not led to socialism anywhere, while on the contrary Marx's and Lenin's teaching about the fundamental changing of society, revolution, actually has brought socialism to large sections of the world, the idea of growing into socialism must be rejected as useless for a movement which really has socialism as a goal. Such a movement must take the road towards fundamental changing of society.

An Inaccurate Presentation of the Problem

But such a conclusion is too cheaply arrived at and the proof is simply not valid for two reasons, which I shall soon explain. First, however, just a little remark about the manner in which the question is presented. It is, intentionally or unintentionally, presented so that the reader must get the impression that only the "clean" transition to socialism is a real revolution, a real fundamental changing of society, while the gradual and harmonious growth means to remain at the status quo.

If these two meanings are implied in the words, the question answers itself of course. Instead the question should have been worded, "Can the transition or fundamental changing of society into socialism take place by a gradual, harmonious 'growing in' as well as by a sudden 'jump'?" If the answer is yes, which of the two methods is charged with more advantages and fewer disadvantages?

The Concept of Revolution

This juggling of concepts comes back in the answer to the question and that is exactly the first reason why I hold the proof to be cheaply arrived at and invalid. In the Marxist theory the word "revolution" means any transition from one economic system of society to another (for example, the transition from feudalism to capitalism). Consequently, any such transition or fundamental change is a revolution, regardless of whether it

is peaceful or violent, parliamentary or unparliamentary, gradual or sudden, harmonious or disharmonious.

When the article says that a movement which wants to introduce socialism must take the revolutionary and fundamentally society-changing road or the "clean" transition road (the favorite child has many names), nothing more is stated than that those who wish to introduce socialism must introduce socialism. And one does not get wiser from that.

According to the Marxist definition of the word "revolution", a gradual and harmonious growing into socialism is a revolution, a clear and fundamentally changing transition from capitalism to socialism. That is, of course, provided that the said growth is completed, but with this sole and only reservation it is as good a revolution as the quick revolution in one "jump". The question is, whether both are possible, and this the "revolutionary" Marxists have flatly denied.

Jump and Causative Relationship

Now I am not ignorant of the fact that the Marxist theory said that all transition from one qualitative state to another happens "in the form of a jump" rapidly and suddenly, as, for example, when water becomes steam by heating to 100°C. But if we look at it more closely we find that also here it is a matter of tautology, as there is no other definition of "jump" than the transition from one qualitative state to another. The mistake is that one is fastening on to the speed with which such changes may take place in chemistry and physics.

One makes it look almost as if there were the question of a miracle: a clear break with the causative relationship. But this is exactly not the case. The causative relationship is entirely unbroken and continuous. Unfortunately, I cannot master the theory of thermodynamics well enough to give the explanation of the change of water into steam, I must limit myself to referring to the authorized textbooks about this.

The Process Takes Time

Precisely when we go from the physical processes to the social-economic ones, we discover that the "revolutionary" Marxists regard the sudden "jump-like" transition from one qualitative state to another as a breach in the causative relationship. Entirely aside from the fact that one must be wary of the analogy between physical and socio-economical processes - (no one can prove that the transition from capitalism to socialism must occur suddenly as with a "jump" just because this is the case with the transition of water from the liquid to the gaseous state) - as I said, entirely aside from this, it is absolutely incontestable that transitions from one form of society to another have always taken time.

One can at the most talk about suddenness, if one is measuring the duration of the transition by the millions of years that life has been on earth. I do not know if any Marxist believes he can tell the date and time of day when Denmark's transition from feudalism to capitalism took place. He can mention important events which he can take as indications of the transition, but the transition itself took place over a longer period.

The same is true of the transition of the Soviet Union from capitalism to socialism.

The Soviet Experience

On November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power, but the problem was not solved by that feat. Officially the constitution of 1936 is regarded as the crucial event, and that means the transition took about twenty years. If one demands that certain juridical forms also belong to a real socialistic society, the transition in the USSR took not twenty but closer to forty years.

It will be objected here that the blame for this lies not with the Bolsheviks but with the counterrevolutionary forces, famine and the intervention wars. It may be reasonable to take the two last-mentioned into consideration, but not the first, because that was not a one-sided product of counterrevolutionary forces alone, but also a product of Lenin's demand for absolute dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, not limited by law.

The Conditions in Denmark

One may think that the Bolsheviks would have lost the battle if they had not followed Lenin, that is admitted; but when we are to find out which way is the best in Denmark today - and we are apparently agreed that our parliamentary tradition makes it impossible for a party to usurp power unlimited by law - then we must not reckon on being able to emulate the Bolsheviks in the trick of fast conversion to socialism.

If one renounces power unlimited by law, one needs take into consideration the wishes and opinions of others, one must proceed cautiously, convince instead of making short work of opponents.

That, of course, is what we understand by democracy, and the democratic way is not only a good way, it is the only one that is passable. However, it is also slower to travel, and there is no use holding onto the belief that the transition to socialism must and shall take place suddenly and abruptly.

I started by saying that there were two reasons why the answer to our question was incorrect and the proof invalid. The other reason is that the mere statement that the idea of growing into socialism so far has not resulted in socialism anywhere is not by any means tantamount to saying that it cannot be done. That it has not so far been done is not necessarily the fault of the idea itself, but may also be due to the fact that the politicians who have tried to introduce socialism "by growing in" have lost sight of the goal, have become tired on the way, and have adjusted themselves to the existing conditions.

Examples of this are directly mentioned in the article. But one cannot of course expect the validity of an idea tested and proven by people who no longer believe in it. -- In other words, it is still an open question whether the theory is valid.

III. WHITHER THE SOVIET UNION

(Some remarks on the starting point for an evaluation of the development within the CPSU)

No. 22, 3 June 1960
Page 2

Kai Moltke

Some SF readers have addressed some questions to me concerning the evaluation of the internal development in the CPSU and the convulsions over the collapse of the summit meeting. There is a search for an evaluation of where the development now will go, especially after the meeting of the Central Committee May 4. The question is: will one risk a return to the cold war and the methods of the Stalin period, or is it probable that "the more progressive and democratic tendencies" will gain the upper hand?

Generally speaking, I believe it is necessary to state that in the Soviet Union one is continuously in the middle of a long transition period with gradual renewal, under inner conflict in the ruling party and in Soviet society. This opinion is not recent with me, nor was it formed after my exclusion from the Danish communist party in 1958. Already in a meeting of the directorate of the said party in 1957, after the report of the Danish party delegation which had visited the USSR and talked with Soviet leaders, I presented some remarks which, according to my notes from the said meeting had the following content:

Independent Marxist Evaluation

"...I believe that with regard to developments in the Soviet Union and the CPSU one must be prepared for the fact that after the errors of the Stalin era and the 'cult of the individual', one will continuously and for a long time be in a transition period in the economic, social and political development process, characterized by constant struggle between the old and the new. Thus extensive and fundamental errors and slips such as those characterizing the "period of person worship" are not corrected and conquered with one stroke or in a short time. Strong elements from the old-time regime (bureaucratic groups) will stubbornly resist the necessary changes under the further development of the socialistic society and the state power. Obsolete viewpoints and methods will only gradually be overcome, and one will probably from time to time be faced with temporary relapses. But in the long run I have no doubt about the general direction of the development towards continued economic progress and towards socialistic democracy.

"Which standpoint should we as Marxists take as to the said inner conflicts in the CPSU? I believe our task must be to follow closely the individual steps in this transition period, and actively to support the most progressive trends in our Soviet brother party: that means such forces as most consistently seek to carry out the epoch-making decisions of the 20th congress of the CPSU ... We must independently use the Marxist analysis also with regard to developments in the socialist world, and not be satisfied only by approving all decisions and changes in the order in which they are made ..."

The Process Continues

I still believe that, generally speaking, this evaluation covers the main parts of the current developments among the Soviet communists. I regard outright return to the methods of the Stalin period to be quite out of the question, both in internal and foreign politics.

As far as bureaucratic government forms - and the privileged position of the "bureaucracy" - are concerned, I think one can say that these dubious factors gradually will be put out of action. [This is] simply because, under the present development, they have become a hindrance both to the continued rational growth of the productive forces and to normal growth of the political and cultural life under rising and more all-sided enlightenment. Therefore, likewise Khrushchev's many and quite fundamental reforms, which among other things also have expanded the direct influence, role and authority of the trade union committees and the collective enterprises. This process in the direction of more democracy can hardly be stopped - as the main trend.

Of significant importance here is Khrushchev's method for breaking down resistance from "the hard ones" in the Molotov-Kaganovich group and from the bureaucracy. Again and again Khrushchev has appealed directly to, and mobilized, both workers and collective farmers to get after the old bureaucratic methods in administration and leadership. Hereby broad popular forces are activated.

IV. THE HISTORY OF THE CPSU

No. 20, 20 May 1960
Pages 6-7

Junius

Part I

The history of the communist party in the USSR is an incredible story of will power and merciless fights, of human devotion and humiliation, unity and strife, vengefulness and goodness, greatness and pettiness - of fanatically fighting men of good will and less good will and about their wise, cowardly, courageous and stupid actions. But first and last it is the story of the greatest human achievement in the history of centuries. Here is a group of people - first a small flock, then more and finally millions - who find the fulcrum from which all things are moved, and in the course of half a century they alter their world totally and irrevocably.

However one may stand on the subject of their means and goals, one must recognize the greatness of their undertaking and achievement.

The History of Two Giants

What history could be written about these people! All other history books will seem poor, if the real history of the communist party of the Soviet Union were written. And what would it not mean to all those who strive to change their world in the same direction as the Russian communists - in socialistic direction?

Some day that history will probably also be written. As far as the time up to the beginning of the 30's is concerned, there are several important historical accounts, but for the time after 1936 we are in the desert.

"The History of the CPSU, a Brief Survey", written by Stalin, is not the history of the Soviet communists. It is the history of a mystical

concept, "the party" which never is in error, incessantly purges itself of rottenness and goes from victory to victory. Aside from two figures - Lenin and Stalin - the people in it are accorded only a secondary role: "the party decided", it says, what does it matter which people it is who make the decisions, when one knows that they make them with Lenin and Stalin at their head?

Mainly the party is described only in the persons of these two "giants": at intervals there occurs, however, a list of the Leninist core which regardless of the historical situation turns out to be persons long dead and persons who, at the time of publication, were close to the author (in the 1938 edition Yezhov belongs to the "Leninist core" of the civil war; in the 1946 edition his role does not appear to be worth mentioning).

Stalin's book about the CPSU is the plainest modern example of "applied history writing". Its purpose is not to describe the course of history and to learn from it, but (1) to praise the communist party as infallible (2) to make Stalin one with it and (3) to smear all his opponents. On the other hand, the book is silent about all the "errors" which all those, who at the time of writing closed ranks around Stalin, had committed during the years.

On the 20th congress of the party this presentation was strongly criticized - for what can present-day youth learn from a "historical analysis" which explains all defeats by referring to enemy agents disguised as leading communists, and all victories as results of the omniscience of a few geniuses?

After four years a new edition of the CPSU history has been published, written by a committee with Ponomarev, who is ideologically close to Stalin, at the head, but not - like Stalin's book - officially authorized by the Central Committee.

One clings to the hope that is contained in the last mentioned circumstance.

From Stalin to Khrushchev

It may appear strange to squander so much space on Stalin's old book about party history, when it is the new that is to be treated. There are two reasons for this: (1) only by comparison with the old presentation can one evaluate the ideological progress: "From Stalin to Khrushchev"; (2) the objections in principle against the old presentation are also valid for the new: its purpose - to strengthen the authority of the current party leadership - is just as dominant.

In the new presentation the party is not the work of two men, but of one - Lenin. Various random recitations of Lenin's adherents do not change this significantly. After Lenin's death more emphasis is given to the Stalin group as a unit. A novelty is the inclusion of the names of all those who belonged to the group - in other words, those Stalin adherents who went "soft" and therefore were liquidated by Stalin: Kossior, Rudzutak "and others".

These two little words, "and others," play the same part as in the old edition. By their use, direct lies are avoided when situations are to

be described where opposition men, who were later executed, supported Lenin or Stalin - a state of affairs often occurring, which is to be hushed up.

Approaches Towards the Truth

Most of the direct lies and the crudest cover-ups have disappeared. It is reported clearly that Lenin was in the minority during the peace negotiations with Germany. But often the truth slips out in a peculiar form: the attentive reader actually learns that Trotsky was the chief of the Red Army - but it is mentioned only in connection with a criticism of it. It is the same with the once famous "troika" - Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev - who fought Trotsky in the period 1920-25: they are mentioned in a subordinate clause, when Zinoviev and Kamenev broke with Stalin. The Stalin-Bukharin coalition which arose thereby is mentioned for the first time when Stalin broke with Bukharin. All of it in subordinate clauses. This is also a way of writing history - one can imagine Denmark's modern political history written in the same way.

Nevertheless, this cautious tribute to truth is a great step forward from Stalin's book. But one will look in vain for a clear view of the membership of the Central Committee and the Politbureau at various times. It was the party, personified by Lenin and the Central Committee - specifically disregarding Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky - that carried out the October Revolution - and not a group consisting of (in addition to those already mentioned): Stalin, Sverdlov, Nogin, Uritsky, Kollontai, Artiom, Dzerzhinsky, Siamian, Berzin, Rykov, Bukharin, Joffe, Sokolnikov, Smilga, Bubnov, Muralov. This presentation is also more practical, as the "party" later thanked the seven last-mentioned, plus the three opponents referred to, in a very special way.

No More Trotskyite Vermin!

In one respect the new presentation constitutes important progress. The use of language has been completely changed: The "Trotskyite vermin", "dregs of humanity" and many other tidbits have disappeared. In a few places there are some "surrenderers" left, and in one place Trotskyism is referred to as a "counterrevolutionary menshevik" movement. Deviations are referred to by the words "against the party" and "erroneous" (the former is worse than the latter). In the entire book there is only one "enemy of the people" namely Beria, who is not even elevated to "foreign agent", only "political adventurer".

The changed form of expression is not accidental. The reader is at the same time given a reasonably objective report of the arguments of the opposition, each time followed by critical remarks. But in by far the greater number of cases it is lack of political judgment for which the authors berate the opposition, and not directly evil intentions. The manifold opposition movements are not looked upon as paid foreign agencies, but as Menshevik movements - i.e. adherents of that wing of the Russian social democracy which regarded it as impossible to build socialism in a backward country like Russia.

That means that they are looked upon as what they were, namely politicians, not criminals. This is the most genuine improvement from Stalin's textbook. But how about the trials? About this in a later article.

Part II

No. 21, 27 May 1960
Pages 6-8

One will naturally search with special interest through the new edition of the party history of CPSU for new factual information and a new evaluation with regard to the tragic chapter of the big trials of the 30's against Stalin's political opponents in the communist party. What new material does the book bring here?

As a rule, one should expect that trials where prominent leaders admit having been despicable spies ever since the founding of the state would be regarded as very important source material, and be included even in the briefest presentation. Can one take the liberty of hushing up such important material?

Stalin, at least, did not think so. In his book (the 1938 edition has 472 pages, large type) about ten pages are used to report the disclosures from these trials. The Ponomarev committee must have been of a different opinion - for in its presentation, the section of which up to 1938 covers 500 closely printed pages, there are zero lines about the big trials.

Paradoxically one feels encouraged by this reach of the most elementary rules of history writing. Surely it impairs the clarity - innumerable persons, frequently mentioned, disappear suddenly without trace from the story, those who do not know better may believe that they have settled down in social security pensions. But a healthy sense of shame is evident through the silence.

The False Theory of the Trials

Indirectly the trials are mentioned in one single place: it is said that Stalin put forth an "erroneous" theory of sharpening the class struggle. "In practice it served as the justification of punitive measures on a large scale against the politically beaten ideological opponents of the party. Also many honest communists and people outside the party who were entirely innocent were exposed to punitive measures". Then the responsibility is laid on Yezhov and Beria, who "exploited the personal shortcomings of J. V. Stalin".

The two sentences quoted (and that is actually all that is said about the mass purges) are written in a somewhat befuddled way. Were the "ideological opponents" not "entirely innocent"? The author apparently does not consider them to be "honest communists", but on the other hand it is said that they were sacrifices to an erroneous theory - and therefore not to justice!

This presentation does not contribute any evidence of clarification in the article of Stalin-followers: it rather increases the process of confusion.

As far as we are concerned, we do not make great demands. We regard it as a significant step forward that it is admitted that a number of the founders of the Soviet state were not German and Japanese spies (as it is

said in Stalin's presentation). If one thought so, one would surely have used at least one line in the 744 pages to mention it ...

A Tame Evaluation of Stalin

The treatment of Stalin is lenient in form and sharp in content, where it follows the criticism already known. The form is most interesting. It is quickly surveyed: seven pages plus a few subordinate clauses here and there in connection with corrections of the "errors".

Three Lines About the "Leningrad Affair"

Is it right to gather all that is negative in a historical period in two small paragraphs, the last of which, furthermore, one does not come across until long after one has finished the period in question? Hundreds of pages are used to describe how well everything is going, and then suddenly some brief, concentrated remarks that it was not at all as well as one just thought.

An example: In 1948-51 the Soviet was shaken by a violent inside party fight which was fought in the deepest secrecy. It took the form of incrimination of Malenkov's political opponents, was named the "Leningrad affair", and cost the lives of, among others, the party leader in Leningrad, the premier of the RSFSR, two Central Committee secretaries and a member of the Politbureau. Does not mention of the "Leningrad affair" belong in the description of the period 1945-53 (chapter 16)? Could it have failed to put its stamp on this period?

One reads through the chapter in vain. All was going very well. More than 30 pages further, in the chapter concerning the period 1953-58 we find in the section "Errors and defects produced by the person worship /cult of the individual/ are corrected" three lines about the "Leningrad affair". It must not be permitted to disturb the general positive picture given of the period 1945-53.

In this way it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to derive a proper lesson from history. It is probably also for that reason that one can read through the conclusions at the end without finding any resume concerning the "person worship". Is the "person worship" not a danger, like "revisionism" and other deviations?

When one studies the concrete decisions of the Central Committee during the last six years, one receives a clear impression that it is. But here in this presentation, theory and practice must always be kept apart. In practice one can make corrections (and one does), but the theory must be kept "pure". It must not be infected - by reality.

More Factual About Opponents

Finally, a very great improvement must be pointed out. While the "anti-party" group liquidated in 1936-39 are still treated in historically incorrect manner, and Beria (certainly correctly) alone is called "enemy of the people", those politicians who after the 20th congress have been given the label "anti-party" are at least treated in a way that is historically correct.

This is quite interesting, because the words one has heard about them during the last three years have not all been friendly. Nevertheless,

Molotov is mentioned in all cases where he has played an important - and from the authors' viewpoint - positive role. The same is true of Bulganin; and under the list of the great military leaders of the War, Zhukov is included.

If only the whole book had been written in that way, much could have been forgiven. It would not have meant that the authors - and the party leadership - would have had to relinquish a criticism of the principles of the various opposition standpoints, from Trotsky to Molotov, but it would undoubtedly have meant that the myth of the "unified party" and the "Leninist core" would have gone by the board. Therefore, if the book should still be effective as propaganda for the party leadership, much greater demands would have been made to the authors' reasoning ability. Already the deliberately limited criticism of Stalin shakes the dogma of infallibility and of unanimity; imagine a similarly tuned-down evaluation extended to include all the prominent personalities in the history of the party!

The result would, in return, be such that the socialist movement, both inside and outside the Soviet Union, could draw practical usefulness from the book, regardless of whether or not one agreed with the evaluations and critical remarks of the authors.

- As the matter now stands, the book is historically considered an expression of an important step forward compared to Stalin's book, so important that one can be sure that the great decisive step also will be made, even in a foreseeable future.

Heavy, Colorless Reading

As a historical presentation the book is important by its comprehensiveness, but in many respects it is useless because it falsifies or distorts the historical sequence - which may be evident from the examples brought out here.

As historical reading it is deadly depressing - the chapter on the last war, the horrors and heroism of which are great enough to surmount even the most pedestrian narrative, is a worthy exception. In contrast to Stalin's book, which had the sole advantage of being readable, it is ponderously written (and obviously translated from a German draft: what for example is "Forsonerisk"?). It will therefore not be much read and not spread much confusion. But on the other hand, it is not authorized by the Central Committee. We are waiting for another edition.

Because the book about the history of the communist party of the Soviet Union is still to come.

V. A SOVIET POET'S SHOWDOWN WITH THE IDOLS OF THE STALIN ERA

(Pravda prepared for May Day a full page poem: "From a Distant Past" by the rebel poet Alexander Tvardovsky.)

In what direction does the development go in the Soviet Union since the recent personnel changes and the meeting of the Central Committee May 4 this year? It is difficult to predict because this is again a period of strife. Personnel changes, however, have also put their mark on the cultural front: By a decree of May 7 the until-now minister of culture Nikolai A. Michailov was removed. He was regarded as belonging to the "hard core" and has caused much trouble for less orthodox authors and artists.

Instead Ekaterina A. Furtseva took office as head of the ministry of culture. She had just been removed from the party secretariat, and has a reputation for belonging to the more "liberal" inner circle around Khrushchev.

A Poem in Pravda

On the literary front a remarkable thing had happened, just before the recent changes and May Day: In Pravda for April 29 there appeared on page 4 a full page poem: "From a Distant Past". The privileged author was one of the "rebels" of Soviet literature, Alexander Tvardovsky.

The selection of Tvardovsky for the poem of the day in Pravda was, in consideration of the previous quarrels in Soviet literary circles, already a sensation, but that was only the smallest part. More sensational was the subject of the poem and the author's treatment of it. Because this is a very unusual poem about Josif V. Stalin, seen through the eyes of a well known Soviet writer. Let us look at some samples:

Separated from Life /Paragraph head - not integral part of poem/

"While he lived separated from life by the walls of the Kremlin
he was over us as a threatening spirit,
and we did not know other names.
He demanded to be glorified, always more,
in the capital as in the village.
There was nothing to add and nothing to cut out.
It was so in the world.
It was so for a quarter of a century.
This man's name echoed together with the word fatherland
as an appeal for fight and work"

Alexander Tvardovsky makes a running charge to topple the idols of the past in the people's minds, and here in Pravda itself /is an attempt to/ break down respect for the false worship of the man and leader, who craved to be the new god of the people. The Soviet poet continues:

The God of the True Believers /Paragraph head - not part of poem/

"He did not know the least moderation
when he first had usurped the rights,
which the name of the god demands from the believers
- those with the deep faith.
And he had already so accustomed himself to this
that he saw the whole world through the smoke of his pipe
- so that he could command over all as a god.
For his hands reached out over all the world's important concerns:
over all production, over all kinds of science,
over the depths of the oceans and the heavenly bodies.

And he listed ahead the number of the many exploits.
It was also to him the heroes owed their honor after death
Our songs were sung about this only in the hour of wrath,
Breaking all laws he was able to let the entire people
feel his sublime anger ..."

Tvardovsky brings out in his poem, undisguised, Stalin's brutal
settlement with all the old fighters of the revolution in the infamous
trials and purges:

"Those who in the beginning had travelled the same road,
who had worked in the underground, known the prisons,
those who had seized the power and had fought -
they were thrown down into the darkness,
one after the other.

The one in the shadows and the sleep -
the long list of them
who became old men before their time ...
Thus he lived on earth.

Thus he led, while he held the reins with an iron hand.
One will seek in vain for the one who not in his presence,
glorified him and exalted him.

It was probably not in vain
that this son of the orient
showed to the utmost the character
of his implacable injustice, his cruelty
and his execution of the law."

Lenin Did Not Teach Us to Create Gods ...

Tvardovsky turns in his poem to the cringing hypocrisy which in the
period of person worship [cult of the individual] became the poisonous
atmosphere around Stalin's figure:

"Was it not the whole world which in the ceremonial hall
hardly gave him time to open his mouth
before they shouted hurrah!

Would he also this time have his way? And why!
Experience has turned to the wrong side.
Whom shall one blame, that it was the way it was?
The great Lenin was no god,
and he did not teach us to create gods!"

And at the end of his great poem of settlement with the past,
Alexander Tvardovsky turns towards the new, about to grow in the rich
Russian soil:

"Today the times are different.
The living earth, which is becoming green,
pushes everything out that is to grow.
The people will direct its great cause on the chosen path -
without trusting its land, its fate and its children's fate
to any deity, from one pinnacle to another.
But it trusts only the real wisdom of the guide.

That is why I now have seen more smiles
and less grief on people's faces ..."

This was the opening note for May Day - the poet's greeting to the people in the party organ Pravda. - Not a bad greeting, which started with a look back at the black winter night which characterized a quarter of a century. "The great Lenin was no god. And he did not teach us to create gods!" An appeal to the people's confidence in itself, while the hollow idols are thrown down. This greeting deserves to be known as a Soviet settlement with the past - with a "distant past" as Tvardovsky calls his poem.

VI. THE PERSONALITY CHANGES IN THE USSR

No. 20, 20 May 1960
Page 5

Unsigned

The justified sensation over the American spy plane that was shot down near Sverdlovsk has caused several other news items from Moscow to be, although not entirely forgotten, at least pushed into the background. This, despite the fact that they may really be just as important.

Prior to the meetings of the Supreme Soviet where Khrushchev presented his sensational speeches - backed up by Foreign Minister Gromyko and Marshal Gretshko - there was a meeting in the Central Committee of the CPSU. The only thing we know so far from this meeting is that it made a series of changes in the leading posts in the party. In this connection partly as a result of this, the Supreme Soviet undertook some further changes. The revamping is of such magnitude that it must be noticed and have serious reasons.

Frol Koslov, who until now was deputy premier, is relieved of this post and transferred to become party secretary - presumably second secretary (Khrushchev is first secretary and Suslov downgraded to second secretary). Furtseva and Ignatov have resigned as secretaries in the party and are appointed minister of culture and deputy minister president respectively.

Two others - previously very prominent - party secretaries Pospelov and Aristov, have disappeared from the secretariat and have been given other, not specified, positions in the Russian Soviet Republic. Pospelov, who was the leader of the CPSU delegation to the Danish party congress in the fall of 1958, has also been fired as member of the Party Presidium (executive committee).

The leader up to now of the Seven Year Plan, Kosygin, has been relieved of this post but has been appointed first deputy premier, Novikov was appointed the new plan leader, and at the same time he became deputy premier (but as far as we know not a member of the party Presidium). Kirishenko and Beljajev, who have had very influential positions, were actually fired from these months ago and transferred to southern provinces. They are now also formally outside the party Presidium. And finally Voroshilov has resigned as president of the Supreme Soviet and is replaced by Brezhnev.

In a way the whole thing went over very quietly. The Central Committee made the decisions in a closed meeting and itself carried out the part pertaining to the party, while the Supreme Soviet (parliament) put the rest into effect. The reason is given only in the case of Voroshilov - his age. A quite different kind of political reasons were given in 1957, when Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Shepilov were ousted, and also when Dulganiin was fired as premier and transferred to North Caucasus.

But such an extensive revamping of the party and state leadership has, of course, its reasons and its importance. It is evidence that there must be within the Soviet leadership significant and incompatible divergences with regard to the policies of the Soviet Union, internal as well as external. But about the nature of the divergencies, no information is available. What one can see however, is that Khrushchev's influence is consolidated by the changes.

It is not believed that this will be the last. Neither should one say that the personalities in party and state leadership should never change: on the contrary. But it cannot be satisfactory or entirely healthy that such comprehensive changes are undertaken after decision in closed meetings and without justification to the people, who can only take notice of the facts - without knowing whether they are expressions for changes in direction to achieve a more stable and consistent progress on the course already taken.

A preliminary evaluation of the revamping can only give the result that Khrushchev obviously has strengthened his position to such an extent that he found himself capable of replacing a number of people who always were open or clandestine dogmatics of the type from the Stalin period. Whether this means real progress cannot be said with certainty. It would unquestionably be progress if not only the party heads but the Soviet people took part in deciding and making changes, but these appear, as we said, to have taken place by a rather extensive palace revolution in reverse.

VII. KHRUSHCHEV'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST BUREAUCRACY AND INEQUALITY: SIGNALS OF INTERNAL POLITICS

No. 23, 10 June 1960
Page 5

Gert Petersen

The dramatic collapse of the summit meeting has had the effect that the foreign policy of the USSR overshadows other topics. When Khrushchev came to East Berlin, however, he laid aside the hard line from Paris, but the content of the Soviet foreign policy at the moment appears actually to fit the description, sharp in words, conciliatory in action. The coexistence line has not been abandoned.

A genuine change in Soviet foreign policy would also be impossible without corresponding changes in internal policy. With an effective "hard" foreign policy goes militarization, discipline and retrenchments at home, accompanied by privileges for the "cadres" without whose active loyalty such a tightening up is not capable of being carried out.

But the Khrushchev group has hitherto associated its name with the diametrically opposite policy and has just started a new push forward. In the higher Soviet meetings in the beginning of May some light was thrown on this, and indications also came out as to why this was regarded as necessary.

In other words, we must take a closer look at Soviet internal policy.

Proposals in the Highest Soviet Meeting

In the meeting of the Central Committee May 4, just before the meeting of the Supreme Soviet, there had taken place a shifting of leading personalities which disclosed deep disagreements. Both the shifted ones and those remaining were strong opponents of the old Molotov foreign policy; the disagreement is about internal questions.

But which? That came out in the Supreme Soviet, when Khrushchev presented proposals, among other things: to legalize the transition to a 42-hour week, which already had started; to discontinue the personal taxes, which will deprive the state of about 10% of its income; to give the tax reform character of a wage assessment; and to increase the production of consumer goods beyond what the Seven Year Plan had anticipated.

All this is explosive. One need only recall that Malenkov fell on a desire to strengthen the light industry. But there is much more ...

Illegal Overtime

Much came out in the speech of the trade union chief Grishkin. Perhaps the shortening of working hours is especially popular in certain director circles, considering that "many enterprises under the Tatar, the Yaroslav and the Lithuanian economic councils are guilty of illegal overtime work and abolishment of rest days". Or when "in many enterprises" "10 to 20%, in some enterprises over 30%, of the total work hours" is wasted in inactivity because deliveries and work organization are badly arranged.

No, the shortening of working hours imposes very great demands on the leaders. And it is not improving, when Grishkin encourages the trade unions to "fight constantly" for the enforcement of the labor laws, and as the topping on the birthday cake he gives out the word that the shortening of working hours will be followed up by increase in wages, a watchword that is supported by the chairman of the labor and wage commission and by Khrushchev himself.

Rising Standard of Living

In this connection, Grishkin refers to the necessity for planning production in broad workers' assemblies. All workers must in a certain sense be brought into the leadership, otherwise the grandiose plans cannot be carried out.

- Also the material and social improvements are naturally of great importance to the work output. The strongly increased offering of consumer goods means that now there is "some purpose in making money". One can get something for one's wages, and Grishkin throws light on the changes in the purchases of workers' families on the basis of a statistical study of the budgets of 15,000 families during the years 1953/59. In addition he presents the information that during the last four years 10 million sewing machines, 18 million radio and TV receivers and 89 million watches have been sold.

A further increase in the capacity of the light industry will of course strengthen this tendency and increase the work output.

Social Inequality

While one surely has been able to obtain agreement about this improvement in the production of the light industry, when the present production basis is considered, there is another question connected with "social atmosphere" that is combustible.

From the speeches in the meeting of the Supreme Soviet it appears that 7 or 8% of the wage earners today receive the minimum wage, 360 rubles a month, that the great majority earn towards 1,000 rubles, and that 0.6% - about 400,000 functionaries, earn over 2,000 rubles a month.

These figures are an expression of social inequality, a heritage from the Stalin period. Stalin was of the opinion that only by a very strong material encouragement could one create the necessary technical and administrative cadres in the then primitive Russia. To some extent this was correct, but the result was a sharp social stratification: and it was in any case wrong to hold onto the principle after 1945.

The Uneven Weight of Price Reduction

Parallel with the very wide wage differentiation, Stalin used a system of consistent price reduction. What did that mean: The prices for the absolute necessities of life were held on a low stable level and were not changed. Those on the lowest economic level used their entire income for those necessities of life, and to them it meant nothing if the prices for clothes, watches, radios etc. were reduced by 10, 20, or 50%. But it meant something for those who earned enough so that they could afford something more than the daily necessities: if the price of clothes was reduced by 25%, then a new set of clothes might come within their reach. The price reduction policy served the same purpose as the wage differentiation, and it likewise produced social inequality.

The New Situation

Today the Soviet Union has a surfeit of capable cadres, and the organization of education guarantees that this is a stable condition. An entirely new generation of workers has grown up, both urban and rural. The new situation has some very decisive effects:

- 1) The problem, which brought into being the glaring social inequalities, has been solved in principle.
- 2) Socialism as a system can only come to full flowering if it is characterized by each individual citizen's conscious and active contribution in the common work.
- 3) From originally being a spur to progress for a technically backward country, the social inequality became the most serious brake on the full development of socialism.

4) Those circles which have had the benefit of the inequality are interested in preserving it, because its abolition will mean loss of their privileges, and because it can take place only at their direct cost.

- There can therefore not be any cause to wonder that there is a sharp conflict in the leading Soviet circles about the abolition of the glaring social inequality. As one will see, this question is perhaps the key question in the present development phase of the USSR.

Khrushchev did not conceal the conflict or the problem when he spoke to the Supreme Soviet. He said, for example: "Some comrades seek to make us go only by the way of price reductions ... but one must keep the fact in view, that one only creates unequal conditions for the population (thereby) ... After the Second World War there arose ... a much too great gap between the wages for the workers in different categories of work, and this gap must be reduced."

Opponent of Inequality

Khrushchev is not against price reduction in principle, but he would have it accompanied by wage increases for those with low wages and cuts for those with high wages. The abolition of personal tax is part of this policy: for incomes under 1,000 rubles the wages are to be increased with an amount equal to the previous tax: incomes over 2,000 rubles, on the other hand, are not to rise, as the nominal wages are reduced to the extent of the amount of tax.

During the meeting Grischkin also explained how the trade unions had caused the wages in a number of trades to be increased 20 to 30% during recent years, and he stated that this policy would be continued.

The Khrushchev wing has thereby answered the question of the further social development with a clear demand for equalization of the great difference between the social strata -- even if it must be done at the cost of the privileged. Others in the leading circles have wished that the Stalin policy of one-sided price reduction should continue, and the glaring social inequality be retained. And the adherents of equalization have won - this round.

During the conflict between the interests of the "bureaucrat cadres" and the common people Khrushchev chose to speak for the people. In 1957 he won over the chief representatives of bureaucracy - Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Purvukhin and others - who resisted a policy which would increase the capacity of the national economy but would weaken the power positions of the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy as such, however, could neither be destroyed nor removed from one day to the next, and it still exercises its influence.

The forthcoming step - to break the material privileges of the bureaucracy, is still more far reaching, and it is not surprising that some of Khrushchev's hitherto firm supporters are dropping away - the top party cadres are of course socially infiltrated in the bureaucracy of officialdom. Therefore Kirichenko and Bieliaev were replaced by two of the most radical Khrushchev adherents, Podgorny and Poljansky.

Preparations for the 22nd Congress

But the conflict is of course not finished. A Central Committee is still in office which was elected in 1956 and is, in all that matters, the result of a compromise between Khrushchev's and Molotov's wings at the time. Only next year will a new leadership be elected on the 22nd congress. It is surely with this congress in mind that the party has again been given the character of a workers' party, by the admission of 2 million workers "from production" since 1956. They will know how to send the right delegates.

International socialism is interested in the victory of the progressive trend, and international capitalism in that of the conservative trend. Perhaps one should bring in this factor when one is evaluating the NATO policy at the moment.

VIII. THE CO-EXISTENCE OF DISTRUST AND THE ABSENT GREAT POWER

No. 20, 20 May 1960
Pages 4-5

Kai Moltke

The summit meeting in Paris started Monday under such tense conditions that the leading statesmen of the great powers literally stumbled into an international crisis - when they as "men of good will" were to seek the way to peace and relaxation of tensions. It was under the pressure of a new alignment of power: the Soviet space ship sent up with precision and under the fresh impression of the storm around the disclosure of American spy plane excursions, that the preparatory steps towards the summit meeting were taken. The danger of a collapse was at once written on the wall, and underscores by Khrushchev's surprizing suggestion that the meeting possibly should be postponed for 6 or 8 months. That was the overture!

One is at once tempted to ask: why, under these circumstances, did Khrushchev go to Paris at all? Only to call off demonstratively Eisenhower's impending visit to Moscow next month and to present his ultimate demands for opening any personal negotiations with the USA's head of state? After Khrushchev's previous declarations, which were much milder, this can hardly be presumed. It rather looks as if the leaders of both the two superpowers have been subject for pressure - both on the home front and from certain allies - and are faced with internal conflicts among influential circles which tie their hands and drive them forwards on dangerous paths.

Khrushchev's Ultimate Demands

Let us look at Khrushchev's three conditions for sitting down at the conference table with Eisenhower: the first demand has the appearance of practical politics. It was that the flights, which were contrary to international law, must be discontinued. That there also was demanded a formal and contrite apology brings a dangerous element of prestige into the foreground in a dubious way. Because thereby Eisenhower would have to disavow himself and his cabinet. Because they have publicly taken the responsibility for the piratical American "aerial inspection".

With Khrushchev's third demand, for "punishment" of those guilty, we are getting close to the ridiculous. How would he expect to sit down at the conference table with a man who was to punish himself and his closest co-workers? Was that not to put a bomb under the summit meeting itself?

The demand appears quite provoking, politically very unwise and not very helpful to a peaceful understanding. As a rule one must choose between a negotiated peace and "war criminal trials". The latter follow upon an unconditional surrender.

Eisenhower's Unavoidable Genuflection

Under Khrushchev's massive offensive President Eisenhower was forced into an important admission - pressured by his allies: He and secretary of state Herter had, after the Sverdlovsk episode, jumped up like lions, had spoken of several years of aerial espionage and had indicated that it would continue. In Paris the president fell down like a lamb and promised to stop the overflights.

The president lied again when he explained that in the May 9 declaration continued aerial espionage had never been indicated, an interpretation of previous declarations which must be called reckless, as John Danstrup correctly reported. Eisenhower after his unsuccessful space flight had to land on the firmer ground of the violated international law.

But the weapons' technical development and the tremendous progress of space exploration opens new fields which the classical international law never could have ~~the~~ imagination to map or codify: How high in the air does the sovereignty of a state go? Soviet sputniks and American satellites will soon be able to map "enemy country" with the same minute certainty as the best espionage plane. Space agreements force themselves into the discussion of security and disarmament. In a near future the satellites will perhaps not only be able to photograph military targets, but also rain down from space both rockets and H-bombs. What use is it then to have control over the patient earth? One must start working on the problems of disarmament and security before the explosion comes! But solutions take time.

Disarmament the Most Important Task

The technical revolution of our age, the possibility for total destruction and the dangers of the atomic race carry also as a sign of the time a need for keeping the ideologies, including the Marxist, up to date. It is admitted that many things have changed. On the 90th anniversary of Lenin's birth the old Finnish veteran Otto V. Kuusinen put forth an important declaration in the name of the Soviet party leaders:

"Peace will win in the end ... Even in the imperialist countries there are more and more sensible leaders who make it clear that a war becomes more and more improbable because of the destructive power of the weapons now existing. It is evident therefore that the Soviet government - at the same time as it remains true to Lenin - follows a policy characterized by firmness with regard to its principles but at the same time open to compromise. The most important task of our times is to arrive at a general disarmament ..."

And Otto V. Kuusinen continued: such is the military-technical dialectic: The new weapon, which was created with an eye to war, is beginning to exercise a pressure in favor of peace. For Marxists there is nothing strange in this. The classics of Marxism have never denied that new weapons types not only cause revolutions in warfare, but also can have an influence on politics. Engels wrote about this in "Anti-Duhring". And H. K. Zrupskaja (Lenin's wife) tells that Lenin foresaw "that there will come a time when war will be so destructive that it becomes entirely impossible" ...

"Revisionism" or not? It is the healthy language of common sense. The admission of one of Marxism's most significant new problems in our times, and the theoretical foundation for the watchword about peaceful coexistence.

The Excluded Great Power

But a relaxation of tensions and progress towards armament limitations and gradual disarmament implies global understanding and negotiation, and in the Paris meeting Asia's leading great power was so far lacking: China with its 6 or 7 million inhabitants - an international factor of rapidly growing importance. The Chinese premier Chou En-lai, in his report to the Supreme People's Council on April 11 of this year, reacted violently against the continuous tendencies to exclude China, and against the attempts to isolate that country. After a sharp protest against the American occupation for years of the large Chinese island of Formosa (Taiwan), Chou pointed out that the American manoeuvre with two Chinese states must be rejected, and he continued:

"China will not under any circumstances take part in any international conferences or organizations whatever where there is any chance that the problem of two Chinese states may arise. No international agreement whatever will have any binding force at all on China, if it is concluded without the participation of Chinese representatives and if their signatures are lacking."

But how can one reach limited global arms reduction or security agreements without China, which has become an Asiatic and global power factor of the first rank? The consequences of a criminal and untenable Western policy is making itself felt, relentlessly. And the explosion in South Korea and the growing ferment in South Vietnam and the entire south-eastern Asia show a tendency of the problem of the Far East to press on again with renewed power.

The Wars, China and the Atomic Age

It is not enough to soothe oneself with the notion that China is just a Soviet satellite, and Moscow will keep Peiping in line. Chinese communism has in recent years moved along highly independent paths, both in theoretical analysis and in practical politics. Let us consider only the problem of war and peace in the atomic age and the growing Soviet recognition of the risk of mutual destruction. Peiping has its own evaluation. The theoretical journal of the Chinese communists "Red Flag" for April 15 dealt with this basic problem and declared that it was shocking for a Leninist to suspend revolutionary actions for fear of war. Then it says further.

"It is absolutely not necessary to give in to USA's atomic pressure. Does not Marxist-Leninism tell us that it is not the technique, but the human being that determines the future of humanity? The most important source of power for warfare lies in the masses. A people's army, well organized and comprised of alert and united masses, will be unconquerable anywhere in the world."

"Red Flag" goes on lecturing that for a socialistic victory the best way is - if not to avoid war, then at least to turn it to the destruction of the opponents - "to orient the psychology of the world's peoples towards this and to permit the peoples in the socialist camp to learn to master modern weapons."

At the risk of being scolded as "revisionist," there is, however, reason not to overlook the fact that it is pre-atomic age political analysis which puts its character on the Chinese communists' particular exposition of Leninism in our time. With China's growing international weight the demands also come up for this country and other socialistic countries first of all to have the opportunity to "master the modern weapons" - to come in as equals in the atomic club.

The Punishment for the Crime of the West

It would be both too superficial and unjust to look at the "particular position" of the Chinese communists as a bit of yesterday's handed-down Marxism - a leftover from the between-the-wars years. Every strong political philosophy and analysis originates and must originate in experience. And the new China's experience with imperialism, and with the American version especially, sprang from very bitter and costly experiences in the past, experiences which are common to many colonial and previously suppressed peoples, which met with imperialism's gangsters of the most cannibalistic caliber. Neither the American intervention in favor of the dictator Chiang Kai-shek nor the Korean war was any Sunday school story - more nearly genocide!

In China one side of western imperialism is best known. From this follow the viewpoints that were presented by the Chinese anniversary speaker Lu Ting-ji on April 22 in Peiping, on the occasion of Lenin's 90th anniversary. The principal recipe was that coexistence between socialism and imperialism never could be any lasting phenomenon, but only a link in a strategy to "destroy imperialism by all means, legal or illegal, peaceful or bloody, economic, political, military and ideological."

The Chinese Platform

Politically they argued as usual against "Tito's revisionists" - but was it not the analysis from the CPSU's 20th congress and the Khrushchev course they were, in the last analysis, aiming at - in spite of the dogma of the uniform political ideology in the communist world and the indestructible solidarity of the communist parties? In the People's Daily in Peiping for April 22 there is a resume of the Chinese viewpoints on peaceful coexistence (reportedly by Mao Tse-tung himself) in the following theses:

1. Formally directed against Tito (but with a sting directed at Khrushchev) it is maintained that the assertions that Lenin's theses about the inescapability of war should be obsolete, must be regarded as "contrary to the truth". As long as capitalism (imperialism) is not overthrown, wars will be inescapable, and the socialist camp does not have to fear the outcome of a third World War, as this will lead to the final downfall of capitalism for the benefit of a new civilization "that is a thousand times higher than the present" - on the atomic ruins!

2. The increased willingness of the West to negotiate must be regarded as a ruse to win time to gain strength for the power struggle. It is furthermore maintained that no real relaxation of tensions can be noted. On the contrary, the international situation has, thanks to the USA's attitude, worsened since Khrushchev's trip to America. It is said to be opportunism to describe Eisenhower as a "man of peace". He is called the "chief of American imperialism", and it is pointed out that there is "no difference between him and Dulles".

"The Permanent Revolution"

Behind the Chinese points of view lies apparently the supposition that a new and revolutionary situation is about to characterize the development especially in the Asiatic and African countries through the anti-imperialistic uprising, and that especially China and the communist camp have the main objective to weaken imperialism by giving full government support to this uprising, if necessary also military support. A new edition of Trotsky's denounced "Permanent Revolution" is here brought into the picture with the risk of war that may result!

On the Western side one is busily speculating about the apparent conflicts between the Soviet and the Chinese communists' analyses and stand-points concerning coexistence, where more than tactical variations are concerned. But during the cold war, the atomic race and the western pressure against both the centers of the socialist world, one will surely scout in vain for cracks in the block of countries with socialist governments. They are bound together by common dangers and common enemies in the cold war: ideological differences no longer develop into political rupture, but instead there is exercised a constant Chinese pressure on Khrushchev and his foreign policy course under the watchword: No arrangement or relaxation of tensions without protection of China's just interests as another great socialistic power!

China's chair is empty in Paris. But nothing can be settled without China. In the last analysis the outcome of the struggle for peaceful coexistence is determined by the policy of the West. Have the leaders of imperialism really become so much wiser, that they recoil from the certain suicide of an atomic war? Only the West can answer the question whether Khrushchev's or Mao's analysis is correct. Perhaps in Paris the understanding will be reached, that peace and relaxation cannot be achieved against the will of China - and that the key to a relaxation must be found in a changed attitude towards the new great power in Asia! In world history erroneous analyses are best corrected by convincing and creative action.

IX. AFTER PARIS

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unsigned

The forced coexistence of tension and suspicion is the outer framework of our time, and it will probably shape events for some time to come. Within certain precincts, however, the past week has shown milder

aspects than one had reason to fear. Apparently the culmination was at Paris. Respite was provided during Khrushchev's visit to Berlin, and the categorical declarations about the Berlin problem and the peace treaty with East Germany will for the time being await a later possibility for a better summit meeting. But the substance for conflict is without solution - and complications are of course far from excluded! There is continued pressure for a solution.

Fairly reassuring, under the circumstances, was also the opening of the UN Security Council meeting to deal with the Soviet complaint against the USA. Gromyko opened his brief with remarkable moderation. In the Soviet proposal there is understandingly demanded a sharp denunciation of the illegal over-flights by American spy planes - which must be characterized as aggressive, and it is demanded that the Security Council urge the US government to discontinue these piratical expeditions. But it does not demand, as in Paris, a condemnation and punishment of the American government. On this basis the Soviet Union has taken a position that is both wise and strong. If this same sensible course had only been taken in Paris!

In the interest of peace and the gradual detente and in the interest of the people, the UN should, for the sake of its own prestige as well, clearly disassociate itself both from the dangerous espionage flights and from the other methods of the cold war, utilized both in the air space and through the so-called iron and bamboo curtains. It shows progress, that the American representative in the UN has declared that U-2 flights will be discontinued, and that they will not be resumed. But the justification of the overflights by the necessity of Eisenhower's "open sky" project (aerial inspection) is out of place. It should be driven home emphatically that new international law can be created only by negotiations and agreements - not by clear violation of the hitherto valid fundamentals of international law.

Aside from the propaganda uproar around Paris, the USA has in the long run damaged itself and its previous military base policy. Both Norway and Pakistan have, because of the American methods, come into an untenable position which has caused them to protest and guard themselves against misuse. But just in the advanced base areas a development appears to be on the move: In Turkey the demonstrations hostile to the government are continuing, and there are also indications that the army is divided. In Japan a veritable popular storm has broken out against the military agreements with America, so strong that Kishi's government appears shaky. Were the popular uprisings in South Korea only an introduction? A strong popular activity against the balancing acts on the brink of the abyss appears to spread!

X. AFTER THE SUMMIT FLASCO:
NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S GREAT CHANCE WHICH WAS WASTED

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Kai Hultke

The summit meeting in Paris ended after a few days of hectic suspense with the big fiasco: It never did get underway, and none of the decisive conflict problems of our times were touched even superficially by the heads of state of the four great powers.

Future historians will undoubtedly study for many years to find the reasons why the whole thing went so wrong, that the two representatives of the world's super powers could not once be brought into a room together even for a brief conference on realities. The performance in Paris shaped itself by the irony of fate as a demonstration of the absolute and diametrical opposite, within the frame of modern diplomacy, of the "peaceful coexistence". It is a fact that a series of unfortunate circumstances joined together and acted against a successful outcome of the summit conference: rigid trench warfare around the German problems, a barren tug-of-war in the disarmament commission, increased tension in the Far East - and as opener the fatal affair of the American espionage plane shot down at Sverdlovsk.

Khrushchev's Mistrust Foretold

It was also a bad omen that Nikita Khrushchev - originally the most untiring spokesman for the summit meeting - had foretold in advance very small chances for a successful outcome. On Monday, May 5, the Soviet prime minister stood up in the Supreme Council and warned coldly against hopes:

"I am in a position to tell you that the behavior of our western partners offers only little hope that we will see the conference achieve concrete results. The declarations of the American leaders, which unfortunately have been approved by Eisenhower, makes us actually foresee a negative outcome of the coming negotiations which are to begin in Paris..."

The Great Chance That was Passed Up

Nevertheless, just /such a possibility as/ Paris offered perhaps Khrushchev's greatest historical chance for success, which was passed up because of lack of flexibility - and the possibility for grasping the chance in order to exploit conspicuous differences among the opponents.

In reality, the American leaders had given Khrushchev all the cards by taking an untenable position both on aerial espionage and international law. They had taken stands which must split the West, and which could have been utilized for much more than propaganda purposes - for practical concessions - if prestige requirements and procedure conditions had not become the only field for Khrushchev's otherwise always lively and initiative-rich activity.

Naturally no Soviet statesman could have accepted Herter's equally provocative and stupid declaration of May 9 without a sharp protest. Eisenhower's approval of his foreign secretary's behavior worsened the matter to the breaking point. Both the American Paris emissaries had now

placed themselves in a completely untenable situation: Their standpoint either had to be abandoned without any grace - or the West would be hopelessly split. The western reactions prove this. Let us look at America.

Adlai Stevenson

It would be possible to compile whole volumes of American protests over Hexter's and Eisenhower's incredibly clumsy behavior in the spy plane affair. Let us first look at a comment from the president's Democratic opponent in the last election, Adlai Stevenson, who in a May 13 speech in Chicago declared:

"The discovery of the spy plane flight and at the same time the statement that we unilaterally would resume the atomic tests, can only contribute to lowering our reputations as defenders of the peace all over the world. Could it serve the purpose of peace and mutual trust to send intelligence missions over the heart of the Soviet Union on the very eve of the long awaited summit conference?

"I can only most sincerely deplore that before the conference itself had started, the impression had been given by America's top leaders that our policy has again been changed, and that they have placed our complete and overall pledge to stop all atomic tests in doubt ..."

A Provocation Against the Summit Meeting

Or let us take Eisenhower's former special advisor on disarmament, Harold Stassen. He was not milder in his condemnation, but declared already on May 7 in Minneapolis:

"In my opinion the American plane which was shot down in Russia was sent there deliberately by some of our officers in order to blow up the summit conference, which has been called for May 16. I doubt that the President knew about or approved Power's mission. If he did not, he should immediately remove the officers involved from their command, no matter how high up they may be."

Similar expressions of protest appeared from a number of the best known political leaders in the USA, without regard to party. Even the great exchange and finance papers in Wall Street spoke out in thoughtful editorials.

The most violent storm against Eisenhower arose, however, after his and Hexter's unfortunate declarations about the flights over the Soviet Union and the accompanying demands for "mutual air inspection". This behavior made even America's world famous foreign policy commentators speak out and lecture the President on elementary international law about the border between war and peace.

Walter Lippmann's Criticism

Already the day after Eisenhower's unfortunate pronouncement, Walter Lippmann came out on May 12 with a merciless criticism in the New York Herald Tribune:

"To avow openly that we intend to violate Soviet sovereignty is to put everybody on the spot. It makes it impossible for the Soviet government to be silent about this incident because now it is challenged openly in the face of the whole world. It is forced to react because no country can

remain passive when another country declares openly that it will carry on a policy which includes intruding upon its territory ... When the spying involves intrusion across frontiers by military aircraft it is also against international law."

The same sharp disapproval also characterized an editorial the next day by the world renowned Republican commentator, James Reston, in the New York Times:

"There is still just a chance to save things in Paris, but not if the President continues his present theme. By demanding the right to intrude into the Soviet Union, the President has put Khrushchev on the spot with the Stalinists, who always have been against a detente, and he has also embarrassed the allies by making their bases a target for Khrushchev's anger ... Eisenhower cannot defy Khrushchev and have his cooperation too ... Instead of going to the election in the fall with a 'peace issue' the GOP may very well be faced with a 'war issue'. By bad administration, bad judgment and bad luck, the Eisenhower tactic has stumbled into a course which also is bad politics."

If Eisenhower was thus deserted by his own in a panicky, split America, there arose in England a veritable storm, and not least in the leading conservative papers, in spite of the evasive reserve of the Macmillan government.

It was something of a scandal about the information given by the daily press to the Danish public, that practically nothing important leaked out about the angry three-day debate which raged in the English House of Commons from May 11 to 13. Labor people of all shades were pressing the government and thundered against the American provocation. One need only a sample from the remarks of the very moderate party leader, Hugh Gaitskill, on May 12:

This Can Bring on Atomic War

"The declaration of the American State Department and the episode of the shot-down airplane lead to the conclusion that the US government considers itself entitled to send its planes into the Soviet airspace. Such action is a clear violation of international law. I hope the government will request that the USA reconsider this.

"A continuation of the reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory constitutes a threat against the peace. Espionage of this kind ... may even bring on atomic war."

The Warning of the Daily Herald

The great social democratic paper Daily Herald had already on May 9 written warningly about the summit meeting in this atmosphere. "The lesson from this unhappy affair consists therein, that negotiations on the highest level are of little use and should be discontinued. The lesson consists therein, that the peace can again be changed to open hostility, if the summit meeting does not reach any agreement of any kind ..."

Nikita Khrushchev could have called it off - until the American threats against international law and Soviet sovereignty had been withdrawn. Such a step would have been understood, and the responsibility would have clearly been with the American leaders.

Generally public opinion in the West supported the realities in the Soviet standpoint. Herein lay Khrushchev's great chance. He had all the cards in hand for a constructive peace policy. But this enormous possibility was tragically not utilized. When Khrushchev in spite of everything went to Paris, one expected real negotiations - and not only an ultimatum and procedure. Such was the mood and the popular opinion in the West. The unhappy course of the meeting gave the opponents of the Soviet Union the undeserved advantage of being able to transfer some of the blame for the break. The atomic age has its physiological laws. People will follow the side which appears least bellicose. And here there was something that started slipping in Paris - temporarily at least.

XI. HAMLET BORIS PASTERNAK
Some words in memory at his death

No 23, 10 June 1960
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Borge Madsen

Now that Pasternak is dead, it will be natural to try a sober evaluation of his authorship. First the man himself. He was a courageous man. He did not yield when he was on Stalin's blacklist because he refused to write the collective hero romances Stalin needed. And he was permitted to live, even if it was just barely that he managed to stay in liberty.

As we know, he withdrew from creative literary activity, but worked on a new Russian translation of Shakespeare. And I am sure his Shakespeare translation must have been excellent. There is something in Pasternak's melancholy spirit that is related to Shakespeare. But where Shakespeare is vital, lusty, full of coarse fun in the middle of the deepest tragedy, Pasternak makes on me a strange anemic impression. And what is the explanation? I actually believe that to Pasternak art was evangelism, while to Shakespeare to write was simply something one did, to make money among other reasons. And Shakespeare actually made enough money, so in his old age he could retire to his native town as a prosperous and respected man.
A Bourgeois Humanist

Pasternak's situation was different. He was indebted both the tradition of the great novelists of the nineteenth century, Tolstoy, Dostoevski, Turgenev, Gogol, probably also to Maxim Gorki, and at the same time he felt that with his sensitive nature he stood outside the raw and stern reality of the revolution. His nerves could not take it. It is only when we understand him in this way that we can evaluate him with a fair amount of justice.

And what then will the evaluation be? It will be a sober recognition of the fact that he was a man of considerable poetic talent, but not a genius, as the advertising clamor proclaimed him to be, when his best seller Dr. Zhivago appeared. But he is not as unimportant and reactionary as, for example, Hans Kirk made him out to be in "Land og Folk" [the Danish communist paper. Transl.] He is a typical bourgeois intellectual, whose abstract craving for justice makes him sympathize with socialism, but at

the same time he is not quite able to comprehend all the problems, political, human, artistic and technical, which a socialist revolution carries with it, and especially when it degenerates, as it did in the worst years of the Stalin epoch, where servility and bootlicking were what brought a man to the top.

Dr. Zhivago's Great Weakness

He could not take it. And as he was entirely devoid of qualifications for understanding the political problems, Dr. Zhivago, that could have become a grand epic novel about an irrepressible revolutionary who did not bow his head, became a book about a tired, disillusioned man. His problem is the mock problem which Koestler poses in his book "The Yogi and the Commissar", that a revolutionary is bound to choose between ending up either as a hard boiled police commissar or as an unworldly observer. But that is a lie.

The real revolutionary socialist fights so that the humanistic ideals, precisely through socialism, may at least have a chance. That one during certain periods must use harsh methods, such as shootings and liquidations, is deplorable, but one does not lose one's faith in the ultimate goal: A world for humans, for really free humans.

Pasternak lost this faith, and one should perhaps not criticize that too much. But because he has written a novel about his own personal problems in the Soviet Russia of Stalinism, is not a reason for lifting this novel to the sky and calling it a masterpiece as the critics did. Because that, it is not. For that, it is too sentimental and disillusioned. But it is one good thing: honest; and this is worth every honor, and of course, it stands far above the potboilers which I believe they are still writing there, where the glorification of the collectives and the kolkhozes and of the great leader geniuses is the main theme.

Various Types of Rebels

By the way, it is also superior to that novel which came out a few years ago, by a young author who had the courage to write a vague criticism of certain forms of corruption within the administration and the economic planning. I have forgotten its title and the author's name, but it dealt with an inventor who was able to rationalize the cement industry, but who was stopped by the planning directors. It was a quite conventional novel, only interesting by the fact that it was permitted to be published in the USSR in serial form, but when it caused vigorous political commotion, it was not permitted to be published in book form.

Of course one must have all possible sympathy for those authors in the Soviet Union who go against the current. But one must at the same time ask whether they go against the current because of a progressive revolutionary attitude, or whether they are in opposition because their ideals are derived from an epoch that is of the past, the liberal bourgeoisie. Boris Pasternak belonged to this latter type. He was honest in his conviction, but he was a political reactionary. He therefore foundered as an artist and ended up in feeble Hamletian melancholy. Let him then now, when he is dead, speak the last word. It is his Hamlet poem, hardly a masterly translation but characteristic of the Pasternak type, and it is therefore of greater political than literary interest.

[Translator's note: the disparaging remark about the translation refers to the Danish translation. Rather than translate this into English, I have lifted the text below from the Signet edition of Dr. Zhivago. This translation is by Bernard Builberg Guernsey.]

HAMLET

The stir is over. I step forth on the boards.
Leaning against an upright at the entrance,
I strain to make the far-off echo yield
A cue to the events that may come in my day.

Night and its murk transfix and pin me,
Staring through thousands of binoculars.
If Thou be willing, Abba, Father,
Remove this cup from me.

I cherish this, Thy rigorous conception,
And I consent to play this part therein;
But another play is running at this moment
So, for the present, release me from the cast.

And yet, the order of the acts has been schemed and plotted,
And nothing can avert the final curtain's fall.
I stand alone. All else is swamped by Pharisaism.
To live life to the end is not a childish task.

It is in many ways an appealing poem. The subject is as weak as it could be, the stage fright that grips an actor when he is about to go on stage and for the umpteenth time speak the lines that have been spoken by the various Hamlets during the last 300 years. The form is not exceedingly inspiring either, and the psychological perspective strangely misdrawn and forced. On top of this it may, in spite of all, be beneficial to read Shakespeare himself, and let the last words that are said about Boris Pasternak be Hamlet's dying lines:

O! I die, Horatio:

The potent poison quite o'er-crows my spirit:
I cannot live to hear the news from England,
But I do prophesy the election lights
on Fortinbras: he has my dying voice;
So tell him, with the occurrents, more and less,
Which have solicited -- The rest is silence.